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Risks of organizational growth to cooperatives’ identity 
 
Riesgo del crecimiento organizacional para la identidad cooperativa 
               ABSTRACT 
 
The evolution of the agricultural sector in France motivated agricultural cooperatives to boost the creation of business groups 
that combine affiliates, which add value to production, and traditional cooperatives, in charge of the production process. The 
new structure merges shareholding governance and associative governance in a hybrid model. The two methods exist at the 
core of affiliates and the traditional structure, respectively. This article outlines the consequences of the hybrid governance 
model on cooperatives’ identity by analyzing the case studies of five French cooperative groups. The analysis reveals an 
identity crisis within the cooperatives after adopting a hybrid model. This crisis is characterized by three adverse effects on 
the relationship between the cooperative and its associates: complexity, distance, and confusion. The consequences of the 
hybrid governance model for agricultural cooperatives are mainly control and incentive mechanisms and weakened 




La evolución del sector agrario en Francia motivó a las cooperativas agrarias a impulsar la creación de grupos de empresas 
que combinen las filiales, encargadas de añadir valor a la producción, y las cooperativas tradicionales, encargadas del proceso 
productivo. La nueva estructura conecta el modo de gobernanza asociativa y el modo de gobernanza accionarial en un modelo 
híbrido. Este artículo describe las consecuencias del modelo híbrido de gobernanza sobre la identidad de las cooperativas a 
través de un análisis que combina los estudios de caso de cinco grupos cooperativos franceses. El análisis revela una crisis 
de identidad dentro de las cooperativas tras la adopción de un modelo híbrido. Esta crisis se caracteriza por tres efectos 
negativos en la relación entre la cooperativa y sus asociados: complejidad, distanciamiento y confusión. Las consecuencias 
de este modelo de gobernanza en las cooperativas se encuentran principalmente en términos de mecanismos de control e 
incentivos y, en el debilitamiento de los valores y principios cooperativos.
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INTRODUCTION 
 
All companies worldwide have undergone profound 
changes to maintain a place in the global economy where 
competition has increased rapidly. Cooperatives do not 
escape this trend. To ensure their survival and increase their 
efficiency, agricultural cooperatives have changed their 
organizational structure. After signing the Single European 
Act in 1986, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT), and the World Commerce Organization (WTO) 
agreements, cooperatives faced Europeanization and the 
globalization of markets and competition. Changing the 
size of the market was complex and required a significant 
number of financial means. 
 
In France, since the 1960s, supermarkets have significantly 
positioned themselves in the agri-food industry (Deneux et 
al., 1999). This positioning resulted in the creation of 
organizations to regroup the purchases of affiliated 
organizations to reduce costs: purchasing centers. The 
pressure created by the purchasing centers forced 
cooperatives to increase their size to be on equal footing 
during negotiations. Thus, less competitive companies 
have been disappearing while large agri-food companies 
have grown in the French agricultural sector. Therefore, 
agricultural cooperatives throughout the territory have 
chosen to unite, giving rise to large cooperative groups 
aiming to make the traditional cooperative structure more 
flexible. 
We identified four main factors for this change of structure: 
internationalization and globalization of markets and 
competitors, the evolution of consumption in France, the 
evolution of regulatory constraints, and the evolution of 
farmers’ behavior. The change in the eating habits of the 
French required enormous adaptation efforts on the part of 
agricultural cooperatives. The adaptation involved 
significant financial resources for research and 
development, agricultural machinery, and advertising. 
Cooperatives had to choose between producing raw 
materials and marketing them to large private groups or 
devising development strategies by investing in processing 
affiliates within their structure. Besides, the reduction of 
protection measures for farmers, the need to comply with 
new regulations, and the requirement to respect sustainable 
development entailed excessive investment by agricultural 
cooperatives. Their current objective is to produce more 
and better products with fewer chemical inputs. 
 
Furthermore, farmers are increasingly demanding quality 
in the content and services provided by cooperatives, which 
is related to changes in cooperative groups’ values and 
principles. Some farmers call for better adaptation and 
diversification of agricultural assistance services offered 
by cooperatives. The change factors, their consequences, 
and challenges for agricultural cooperatives are 
summarized in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Significant change factors, consequences, and challenges for agricultural cooperatives. 







globalization of markets and 
competitors 
Change in strategy to reduce costs 
or differentiate products from the 
competition 
To adapt to the new context by 
finding the optimal size to reduce 
legal restrictions (exclusivity, 
territoriality, a-capitalisme) without 
losing the cooperative identity 
Evolution of consumption in 
France 
Adapting the product to 
consumer demand 
To find financial resources to develop 
new technologies and innovative 
products 
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Evolution of regulatory 
limitations 
- Decreased protection 
against price falls and 
the application of aid 
per hectare and not per 
production 
- Compliance with new 
standards 
- Participation in 
sustainable 
development initiatives 
- To maintain agricultural 
exports (comparative 
advantages) 
- To find the necessary funds to 
comply with the regulations. 
- To produce more and better 
products by the sustainable 
development logic 
 
Evolution of farmers’ 
behavior 
- Evolution of cooperative 
values (moving from 
equality to equity): no 
cooperative-associate 
relationship. 
- Increased demands by 
members 
- To maintain relationships with 
members: Create a differentiated 
marketing strategy for engaged 
members. 
- To develop skills that allow 
better assistance to farmers 
(changing technical advice to 
comprehensive advice) 
Source: own elaboration based on Vargas-Prieto (2013). 
 
After tightening the competitive agricultural environment 
in Europe, linked to globalization, the 1991 and 1992 laws 
were adopted to organize affiliates and strengthen their 
funds for agricultural cooperatives, which accelerated the 
establishment of cooperative business groups in the 1990s 
(Vargas-Prieto, 2013). These groups incorporated in three 
ways: 1) merging marketing cooperatives; 2) starting 
processing and marketing groups with a dominant activity; 
and 3) forming polyvalent groups through centralized 
cooperatives or unions such as Unicopa (Koulytchizky & 
Mauget, 2003). Hence, such groups have positioned 
themselves in the European agri-food market thanks to the 
combination of traditional cooperatives with affiliates, 
which are private companies at the end of the production 
chain.  
 
By adopting strategies like those of their private-sector 
competitors, cooperatives in France evolved to maintain 
their market share. Size is presented as a critical success 
factor by several authors (Agricultural Co-operatives in UE 
[Cogeca], 2010; Rouault, 2010); thus, cooperatives 
diversified their activities until large cooperative groups 
were formed through financial holding companies 
(Forestier & Mauget, 2000). However, these cooperative 
groups show duality in governance methods (associative 
and shareholding), manifested in a hybrid model (Dávila-
Ladrón de Guevara et al., 2020; Vargas-Prieto, 2014). This 
article analyzes the consequences of the hybrid model of 




We chose the case study method, intended for the in-depth 
description and analysis of a small sample. Yin (2009) 
affirms that the behavior of a group and organizational 
processes must be explored through a case study and 
defines it as “an empirical investigation that examines a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context 
when the limits between the phenomenon and the context 
are not evident and in which multiple data sources are 
used” (p. 17). According to Albarello (2011) and Vargas-
Prieto & Yepes Lugo (2018), this type of study is 
particularly appropriate for analyzing activities, programs, 
or groups, or when the studied phenomenon is linked to the 
context in which it emerged and developed. For Creswell 
(2007) and Yin (2009), a case study is very effective for 
testing hypotheses that involve understanding a global 
situation or identifying the specific characteristics of an 
event, activity, or program. We chose it as it allows the in-
depth study of the five French cooperative groups selected 
based on the following inclusion criteria (Table 2).
Table 2. Sample selection criteria 
Criteria  Description 
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Source: own elaboration based on Vargas-Prieto (2013). 
 
Taking Table 2 into account, the five selected groups were 
Axéréal, Champagne-Céréales, Agrial, Terrena, and Emc2. 
The characteristics of these cooperative groups are 
presented in Table 3.





Emc2 Sodiaal Terreana 
Group’s 
creation date 














































7 10 7 6 60 13 
Territorial 
Coverage 












and Access to 
Information 
+++* +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ 
Note: * +++ Easy access and availability of data. 
Source: own elaboration based on Vargas-Prieto (2013). 
 
The research data come from three information-gathering 
techniques: contextual observation, interviews, and 
document collection. 
 
The Hybrid Governance Model of Agricultural 
Cooperative Groups 
In the beginning, the governance of cooperatives was 
considered original because it was based on the principle 
of democracy (Novkovic & Miner, 2015). According to its 
principles, associates are involved in leader election, 
control, management, and strategy selection. This 
commitment is reflected in the “one man-one vote” 
principle, which according to the Cooperative Act, 
guarantees the balance of powers; therefore, each member 
has the right to vote, regardless of the size of their farm 
(International Co-operative Alliance (ICA), 1995, 2013, 
2015). However, the evolution of cooperatives, marked by 
the appearance of groups, partly questions these operating 
Theoretical 
representativeness  
Proactive strategy: Cooperative groups resulting from a merger, 
partnership, or acquisition  
Variety 
Specialized national groups, specialized regional groups, multipurpose 
regional groups, multipurpose departmental groups  
Balance 
One specialized national group 
Two specialized regional groups 
Two multipurpose regional groups 
One multipurpose departmental group  
Discovery potential Cooperative groups available to deliver the information  
Amanda Vargas-Prieto & Enrique Arrieta-Díaz 
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principles. Trough the concept of governance, this section 
analyzes the two opposing methods within cooperative 
groups. 
 
The Two Prevailing Views of Corporate Governance 
According to Charreaux (2017), governance refers to the 
mechanisms that effectively delimit the power of leaders 
and influence their decisions. One of the first analyses that 
seek to understand who controls a company and how is 
Berle & Means’ (1932). Berle and Means’ (1932) objective 
was to show that a joint-stock company causes the 
separation of ownership and control. “The decision-making 
power then transfers from the shareholders-owners to the 
directors overseeing management” (Plane, 2000, p. 17). 
“Governance arises from the need to monitor management 
and establishes the rules that delimit the delegation of 
management and control over the company and the 
decision-making process” (Baron, 2003, p. 35). 
 
Governance theory has two widely held views that offer 
different explanations of organizations’ efficiency in value 
creation and distribution (Charreaux & Desbrières, 1998): 
the contractual view and the cognitive view. The first 
considers the company a system of contractual 
relationships, a “knot of contracts” between individuals. 
This perspective is based on the economic theory 
assumptions of rational behavior and the search for the 
Pareto optimality by the equilibrium method (in a situation 
of imperfect information) (Coriat & Weinstein, 2010). 
However, due to information asymmetries and conflicts of 
interest, value maximization can be difficult or impossible. 
Therefore, the contractual view is associated with a 
restrictive or negative outlook, as the source of efficiency 
is generally disciplinary (Charreaux, 2002).  
 
The second view of governance is based on various 
cognitive theories of business. These have arisen from 
behavioral assumptions, linked to bounded rationality and 
the theory of knowledge and individual and collective 
learning, as opposed to the equilibrium method. The 
company is defined as a “knot of skills” (Coriat & 
Weinstein, 2010). According to these authors, both views 
are intertwined; one of the theory of the firm’s main 
challenges is determining how they come together. The 
study of corporate governance helps to understand the 
creation and distribution of value in an organization. 
Therefore, through cooperation, any organization is 
expected to produce a surplus to the resources consumed 
and distribute it to maintain the organization’s 
sustainability (Charreaux, 2002). 
 
In agricultural cooperative groups, the evolution between 
the two governance methods (associative and 
shareholding) is demonstrated in light of the company’s 
contractual view, which allows understanding the complex 
interactions between both methods and highlights the 
rational behavior that trigger the creation of agricultural 
cooperatives. By presenting a hybrid governance model, 
value creation in cooperative groups rests on the offered 
skills and includes long-term cooperative relationships for 
specific employees or members. In this sense, the 
contractual view provides a limited value creation process 
in cooperative groups. Cognitive theories attach 
considerable importance to the development of companies’ 
skills and capacities to innovate. Therefore, value creation 
in cooperative groups will depend on the source of the 
organization’s coherent set of skills (Teece et al., 1994), 
whose distinctive character derives from its capacity to 
produce knowledge and be sustainably profitable. 
 
The first part of the analysis uses the concepts forged by 
the contractual view of company, how to create value for 
shareholders, and the associative method. According to the 
cooperative principles above, traditional cooperatives 
operate under the associative governance method 
(Gianfaldoni & Richez-Battesti, 2008; Novkovic, 2008). 
However, the emergence of cooperative groups is closer to 
a shareholding governance method. The following section 
demonstrates how the governance of cooperative groups 
falls between the associative and shareholding governance 
methods. 
 
Cooperative Governance: From Associative to 
Shareholding Methods 
As a result of the structural changes in agricultural 
cooperatives, it could be expected that these companies 
would go from an associative to a shareholder method and 
from a traditional cooperative model to a cooperative group 
one. They now use both approaches to value creation, 
which involve two different ways of defining a company 
and its objectives. In the associative model, the companies 
aim to produce a surplus of resources and distribute them 
to maintain the organization’s sustainability through the 
cooperation of all actors (Charreaux, 2017; Charreaux & 
Desbrières, 1998). Therefore, this model does not focus 
only on analyzing the relationship between shareholders 
and leaders but also covers all the company’s relationships 
with its stakeholders: employees, customers, suppliers, 
creditors, governments, and their environment in general. 
The study of governance has made it possible to renew and 
broaden the analysis of the performance of companies 
within the social and solidarity economy such as mutuals 
and cooperatives (Charreaux, 2000; Gianfaldoni & Richez-
Battesti, 2008). 
 
Agricultural cooperatives are companies whose corporate 
RISKS OF ORGANIZATIONAL GROWTH TO COOPERATIVES’ IDENTITY 
606 
Clío América / ISSN Web 2389-7848 / Vol. 15, No. 29, enero – junio de 2021 
purpose is to extend the activities of farmers, owners, and 
customers. According to Article L521-1 of the Rural Code, 
their objective is to allow the common use of every channel 
to develop or facilitate economic enterprise and improve its 
results. The difference between cooperatives and private 
companies is that the former serve members through profit 
distribution, as they are structured around values and 
principles of solidarity and democracy. Thus, the 
cooperative’s relationship with its members is based on 
solidarity rather than economic gain. Besides, the incentive 
mechanisms are established from associates’ participation 
in decision-making and loyalty recognition (discounts or 
loyalty discounts). Furthermore, emphasis is placed on the 
financing role of banks in cooperative groups (Charreaux, 
2000; Gianfaldoni & Richez-Battesti, 2008), as this 
relationship helps to reduce the asymmetry of information, 
in contrast to private companies. 
 
In the associative model, the company is analyzed as a node 
of multiple contracts between the different stakeholders 
that seek to maximize their value. Therefore, the most 
critical aspect of value creation has to do with reducing 
agency costs related to conflicts of interest between the 
various actors of a company. Costs can be incurred due to 
the separation between ownership and control in large 
organizations, such as decision-making when there are 
many stakeholders in a company. According to 
Gianfaldoni & Richez-Battesti (2008), this government 
method is more complex, as it includes all stakeholders. 
Also, in the literature, it corresponds to an internal control 
logic based on the institutional structure such as the board 
of directors, the general meeting, committees, or 
commissions (Hyafil, 1997). Power and control are shared 
between actors: shareholders or partners, customers, 
employees, leaders, among others; therefore, its 
effectiveness depends on the consensus between these.  
 
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development explains that: “governance refers to the 
relationship between the management of a company, its 
board, its shareholders and other stakeholders […] it also 
determines the structure by which the objectives of a 
company are defined, as well as the necessary means to 
achieve and ensure the results” (OECD, 2004, p. 64). Such 
definition was adopted due to the importance of corporate 
governance for the study of cooperatives, as it considers the 
company’s different stakeholders. L’Institut Français 
D’Administrateurs (IFA) (2006) also used this definition in 
its study on the governance of cooperatives and mutuals, 
considering that these types of companies should not only 
maximize financial profitability but also satisfy the needs 
of members/customers —dual quality principle— by 
participating in management and benefiting from services 
simultaneously. 
 
In the shareholding model, the purpose of corporate 
management is to maximize shareholder wealth by aligning 
the behavior of managers with the objectives of 
shareholders through monetary incentives and internal and 
external control mechanisms (Caby & Hirigoyen, 2005). 
Monetary incentives are rewards, bonuses, performance-
indexed salaries and stock options. In addition, 
performance-based firing decisions are an option to 
maintain productivity (Jensen & Murphy, 1990). All of the 
latter are intended to solve the problem of manager 
compensation. Control mechanisms are mainly external 
through the financial market (Moerland, 1995): the 
geographical location of invested capital, the board of 
directors, debt policy, financial markets, the labor market, 
and competition (Caby & Hirigoyen, 2005). The board of 
directors represents internal control, but its structure is 
correlated with participation, unlike the associative 
governance method; there are also independent directors 
(Tifafi & Dufour, 2006). The approach to creating value for 
shareholders supports the growth of investments (the 
objective of leaders) and ensures financial viability (the 
objective of shareholders). The characteristics that 
distinguish shareholding governance include the role of 
capital markets in financing (Allen, 1993; Hyafil, 1997). 
 
As for agricultural cooperatives, their transformation into 
cooperative groups has caused them to seek, to some 
extent, shareholder value. The risk of this evolution is that 
the search for associative value gradually dispels the search 
for value for shareholders. This new governance model 
would no longer be at the service of the associate, not even 




The Hybrid Governance Model 
This section analyzes the consequences of the hybrid 
governance model for agricultural cooperatives. According 
to the functioning of cooperative groups, traditional 
cooperatives are identified with an internal logic of 
associative governance. This logic is represented by the 
president-CEO couple, the management team-board of 
directors combination, training, information, and the 
participation of the different stakeholders in the decision-
making process (internal to the organization such as 
managers, partners, employees, and external customers 
such as other cooperatives and public authorities). 
However, the development of cooperative groups is 
characterized in the literature by the transition from an 
associative model of governance to a hybrid one (Côté, 
Amanda Vargas-Prieto & Enrique Arrieta-Díaz 
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2006; Draperi, 2007; Forestier & Mauget, 2000; 
Gianfaldoni & Richez-Battesti, 2008; Richez-Battesti, 
2006). 
 
This model represents the convergence between the two 
governance methods: the shareholding type whose 
adoption is necessary due to the increasingly competitive 
context, and the associative one that traditionally 
characterizes this type of company (Koulytchizky & 
Mauget, 2003). In fact, in cooperative groups, a dissolution 
of the original cooperative principles due to an 
organizational change is noted. The new owners are, firstly, 
the members of traditional cooperatives and the 
shareholders-investors of private-sector affiliates. The 
value to be maximized is neither associative nor 
shareholding; it is the value of the group, and the objective 
is to maintain the new structure. Such an approach, 
proposed by Charreaux & Desbrières (1998), assumes that 
the relationship between an organization and stakeholders 
is co-constructed to maximize the value of the group and 
not only to maintain business relationships; hence, legal 
restrictions become more flexible. For example, 
exclusivity and free membership are not respected in 
private affiliates. Some characteristics of the hybrid 
governance model is that cooperative groups are financed 
by the capital market and control and incentive 
mechanisms change to shareholder governance. In this, 
various places in a company coexist at different levels, 
generating a disconnect between private affiliates and those 
of the cooperative. Market discipline also participates 
through the evolution of share prices, strengthening 
product market, regulations, and restructuring. 
 
Finally, compensation mechanisms are established to 
incentivize managers and employees (including 
agricultural advisers). Regarding the weakening of 
cooperative values and principles, the development of 
agrarian cooperative groups harmed traditional 
cooperatives. Solidarity became selective and the principle 
of equality turned into capital by introducing a price for 
each service offered by the cooperative (Côté, 2001). If we 
refer to principles, a-capitalisme is eliminated from the 
hybrid governance model. The payment method is the same 
as when the farmer is a shareholder of a private company. 
Cooperative democracy remains valid only within the 
parent company, but the power of affiliates depends on the 
proportion of capital they represent (Koulytchizky & 
Mauget, 2001). Furthermore, the principle of “free 
membership” can be modified in cooperative groups to 
benefit the interests of private affiliates. The consequences 
of creating cooperative groups are summarized in Table 4. 
It incorporates the organizational structure and identity 
changes experienced by French agricultural cooperatives 
(values and principles). 
 
Table 4. Characteristics of the hybrid governance model in agricultural cooperative groups 
Government 
method/specs 
Hybrid model / 
Agricultural cooperative groups 
Definition of the 
governance system and 
objective 
A set of mechanisms to maintain the cooperative group  
Its objective is to maximize the group’s value. 
Form of the company and 
shareholders 
Coexistence of business forms: traditional cooperatives, financial 
holding companies, and marketing affiliates 
Power structure 
The democratic principle “one man, one vote” applies to the parent 
company, but the power of affiliates is generally proportional to each 
partner’s capital. 
The loss of the cooperative identity is equal to the change of values. 
Financing sources Funds are raised through the stock market. 
Control mechanisms 
Internal logic for cooperatives (general meeting, boards of directors, advisory 
board, committees, commissions) and external logic for affiliates (board of 
directors composed of shareholders according to the ownership of capital and 
presence of independent directors) 
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Incentive mechanisms 
For traditional cooperatives, incentives are collectively derived from 
participation in decision-making (discounts, promotions, exclusivity 
principle); for affiliates, the compensation mechanisms for leaders are related 
to economic performance. 
Source: Own elaboration based on Vargas-Prieto (2013). 
 
It can be deduced that the consequences of a hybrid 
governance model in agricultural cooperatives are of two 
types: control and incentive mechanisms and weakened 




The transition of cooperatives to a hybrid governance 
model has adversely affected the relationship between 
cooperatives and its members. The literature suggests 
several adverse effects related to the emergence of 
cooperative groups in different sectors of the economy. In 
particular, Forestier & Mauget (2001) describe distancing, 
complexity, and confusion in the agricultural sector. 
 
The creation of cooperative groups with thousands of 
members has increased the size of cooperatives. According 
to Draperi (2007), some cooperatives have distanced 
themselves from their associates by setting up financial 
holding companies and combining solidarity economy 
structures with private companies, thereby dividing 
themselves between the interests of associates and the 
shareholders of private companies. The associates thus 
experience a remoteness effect from the cooperative’s 
decision-making structures, corresponding to the 
anonymization of members, as the leaders of the 
cooperative are no longer known. The members of a 
cooperative group face an unknown company (unknown 
history, strategy, and management) and do not hesitate to 
look for more advantageous offers, even outside of it, 
particularly in sectors characterized by the high volatility 
of raw material prices (such as the cereal sector). 
Associates are no longer cooperative members, but 
customers, and meeting their needs is not the ultimae goal. 
It is instead a necessary step towards increasing 
shareholder value. 
 
A second adverse effect is complexity. Cooperative groups 
now have complex organization charts. They combine the 
organization charts of cooperatives with trading 
companies, making them diffuse and difficult to 
understand for all members. Complexity reinforces the 
remoteness effect above. Furthermore, Thériault (1997) 
considers that the new cooperative model is a «fictitious» 
association of people, as the participant becomes a 
customer (utilitarian rationality and consumer behavior) 
who is not able to assess the nature of the relationship with 
their cooperative (Côté, 2007). The question that arises is 
where the meaning of the cooperative’s collective action 
lies. The increased number of associates facilitates a free-
rider problem, whereby an associate wants to take 
advantage of collective action without contributing 
anything (Olson, 1965). It is becoming increasingly 
difficult to differentiate a cooperative from its competitors 
in the private sector. 
 
The third adverse effect of the emergence of cooperation 
groups in the agricultural sector is confusion. Associates 
cope with two forms of profit distribution: production 
activity (associative form) and capital ownership (capitalist 
form).  Associates perceive this mixture of associative and 
capitalist forms as a transformation of their shares and 
rights to use the cooperative into the capital of a public 
limited company. They are witnessing the questioning of a 
cooperative model that can be recognized as a deterioration 
of the relationship between the cooperative and its 
associates. For this hybrid model to work, cooperatives 





It has been shown that the emergence of cooperation 
groups has allowed agricultural cooperatives to adjust to 
economic changes and thus ensure their progress. 
However, this is not without consequences for the 
cooperative-associate relationship. The change in the 
structure of agricultural cooperatives has confusion, 
complexity, and distancing effects for the associates. With 
the integration of the cooperative into a business group, the 
associate feels like another pawn in an economic interplay 
whose rules are not accessible to them. Today, the 
cooperative employs a dispersed model that integrates 
associative and shareholding governance methods, which 
is hard for members to comprehend, as they perceive 
decision-making far from them and do not identify 
themselves with these new structures. The consequences of 
the hybrid governance model for agricultural cooperatives 
are mainly related to control and incentive mechanisms and 
weakening cooperative values and principles. 
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